The Forced Return of Afghan Refugees: A Brewing Crisis Empowering ISIS-K

This piece originally appeared in EURASIAREVIEW on September 26, 2025 (Photo; AI Created)

Introduction

Afghanistan today stands at the intersection of humanitarian catastrophe and geopolitical volatility. The forced mass return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran has triggered profound concerns not only for the lives of these vulnerable returnees but also for the stability of Afghanistan and the wider region. Diplomatic and security sources warn that the sudden deportations risk becoming a gift to the Islamic State’s Khorasan branch (ISIS-K), which is already entrenched in Afghanistan’s east and has demonstrated a capacity for lethal attacks against civilians, international institutions, and even the Taliban regime.

While the Taliban remain unprepared to handle a crisis of this magnitude, the policies of Pakistan and Iran, coupled with their long history of hosting and manipulating militant groups, risk fueling a security situation that could spiral far beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

Pakistan, Iran, and the Militant Legacy

It is no secret that Pakistan has historically served as the principal incubator of militant groups operating in Afghanistan. From the Taliban to various jihadist factions, Pakistani territory and intelligence networks provided training, resources, and sanctuaries. Senior Pakistani officials have, at times, admitted this role — whether through slip of tongue or under pressure from international forums or at the last stage of their careers or lives. ISIS-K itself found footholds in Orakzai tribal district under Pakistan’s control at this point, from where it launched attacks across the Durand Line into eastern Afghanistan.

Iran, for its part, has played a more subtle but equally consequential role. Tehran organized, trained, and deployed the “Liwa Fatemiyoun”, a brigade composed primarily of Afghan Shi’a refugees, to fight in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime. With the collapse of ISIS’s territorial control in Syria and the stabilization of Assad’s rule, many Fatemiyoun fighters reportedly returned to Iran. Their future remains uncertain — but their potential redeployment into Afghanistan under the guise of deported “returnees” presents a grave risk. Iran has historically used proxy forces to advance its regional interests, and Afghanistan may not be an exception.

Deportations as a Cover for Infiltration

The current wave of deportations from Pakistan and Iran does not consist solely of innocent families being sent back to their homeland under duress. History suggests that alongside genuine refugees, militant actors and proxy fighters may be deliberately planted within these returnee populations.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan used refugee movements as a cloak for transferring fighters into Afghanistan, and then the kept doing the same throughout the last three decades. Today, a similar dynamic could be at play. As tens of thousands of Afghans are forced back across the border, ISIS-K cadres and veterans of other conflicts, including Syria, may slip through undetected.

This is more than just speculation; it is a logical extension of both countries’ past behaviors. Pakistan views instability in Afghanistan as a tool for strategic depth against India, and to receive financial, military and political assistance from the U.S., while Iran seeks leverage over Kabul to safeguard its own security and geopolitical interests. By embedding proxies within deportee waves, both states may be pursuing their time-tested strategy of indirect influence.

Humanitarian Desperation as a Recruitment Pool

Beyond infiltration, the deportations create fertile ground for ISIS-K recruitment. Afghanistan’s economy has already collapsed under Taliban misrule. Jobs are scarce, hunger widespread, and poverty endemic. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of returnees will worsen unemployment, strain social services, and deepen public despair.

ISIS-K thrives in such conditions. Its recruiters target the young, the poor, and the disillusioned — exactly the profile of many deportees. Refugees who spent years or decades in Pakistan or Iran may find themselves alienated from Afghanistan’s restrictive Taliban society. They return to a country where they lack networks, economic opportunities, and sometimes even a sense of belonging. In their vulnerability, ISIS-K and other extremist factions offer not only financial incentives but also a sense of purpose and identity.

This is the tragic paradox: while deportations are framed as a security measure by Pakistan and Iran, in reality they create the very insecurity they claim to guard against.

Taliban Incapacity and Governance Crisis

The Taliban regime, despite claiming to have restored “security” to Afghanistan, lacks the institutional capacity to manage this crisis. Its security apparatus is focused primarily on suppressing internal dissent, controlling women, and maintaining ideological dominance. It has no coherent refugee reintegration program, no resources to provide jobs or housing, and no serious counter-extremism strategy.

This incapacity creates an open playing field for ISIS-K. Taliban fighters may prevent isolated attacks in Kabul or Jalalabad, but they cannot control the structural forces — mass poverty, disenfranchisement, and regional manipulation — that empower their rivals.

In fact, ISIS-K’s attacks against Taliban officials and positions demonstrate that the group is not only a threat to Afghan civilians but also to the Taliban’s very monopoly on violence. The deportations will tip the balance further by adding both potential infiltrators and new recruits to ISIS-K’s ranks.

Iran’s Fatemiyoun Card

Among the most concerning developments is the potential redeployment of “Fatemiyoun Brigade veterans.” These fighters, seasoned in Syria’s brutal war, represent a pool of thousands of Afghan nationals who are battle-hardened and ideologically aligned with Tehran. Iran could use them in Afghanistan for multiple purposes: to pressure the Taliban, to counter ISIS-K’s Sunni extremism, or simply to maintain leverage in Afghan politics.

The return of such fighters, whether voluntary or orchestrated, would not only destabilize Afghanistan but also inject sectarian dimensions into its conflict. Afghanistan has long been scarred by ethnic and sectarian tensions. The reintroduction of a Shi’a militia, even covertly, risks igniting clashes with Sunni groups, further fracturing Afghan society and making it ripe for ISIS-K exploitation.

Regional Implications

The crisis does not stop at Afghanistan’s borders. Policymakers across South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East must prepare for ripple effects:

Pakistan may find itself confronting blowback if militants it once tolerated or supported turn their guns inward, as has often happened in the past.

Iran risks regional censure if its manipulation of deportees and militias becomes too blatant, while also facing the danger of Sunni extremist retaliation on its soil.

Central Asian republics already fear the spread of extremism across porous borders. ISIS-K has expressed ambitions beyond Afghanistan, and instability could embolden its reach northward.

The wider world — particularly the U.S. and Europe — must contend with the possibility of Afghanistan once again becoming a hub for international terrorism, as disillusioned and displaced Afghans are funneled into extremist networks.

The International Responsibility

The forced return of Afghan refugees is not just a bilateral or domestic issue; it is an international crisis. The “United Nations,” “United States,” and other global actors must recognize that deportations without humanitarian support fuel insecurity rather than reduce it. Emergency aid, reintegration programs, and monitoring mechanisms are urgently needed.

At the same time, diplomatic pressure must be applied on Pakistan and Iran to end the practice of mass deportations and to stop using Afghan refugees as pawns in their geopolitical games. Allowing instability in Afghanistan to fester will eventually threaten regional and global security.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is once again at risk of becoming the epicenter of terrorism and regional instability. The mass return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran, far from stabilizing the region, opens the door for ISIS-K and other militant groups to strengthen their foothold. History shows that both Pakistan and Iran have weaponized refugee movements and proxy militias to pursue their interests. Today, they risk repeating the same playbook, with consequences that will not be confined to Afghanistan’s borders.

Unless the international community intervenes swiftly — through humanitarian aid, diplomatic engagement, and counter-extremism measures — the deportation crisis could transform into a new chapter of violence and radicalization. For Afghanistan’s people, already exhausted by decades of war, this would be a tragedy. For the region and the world, it could be a strategic nightmare.