Pakistan: Washington’s ‘Slumdog Strategy’ And The Risks To U.S.–Iran Peace

This piece originally appeared in EURASIAREVIEW on March 02, 2025 (Photo; AI generated)

By: Najib Azad

If a future agreement between the United States and Iran fails, it will not be because diplomacy is inherently flawed. It will fail because of structural contradictions embedded in the geopolitical architecture surrounding it — particularly the continued reliance on Pakistan as a strategic intermediary.

The recent suggestion that Pakistan could host or mediate U.S.–Iran negotiations is not merely surprising; it is strategically concerning. It reflects a persistent tendency in U.S. foreign policy to elevate Pakistan’s role beyond what its historical conduct justifies.

For decades, Pakistan has operated within a strategic framework often described as “strategic depth.” In theory, this doctrine seeks to provide security buffers. In practice, it has frequently translated into influence through non-state actors, regional leverage, and calibrated instability.

This is not a new phenomenon.

During the Cold War, Pakistan became the central conduit for U.S. and allied support to Afghan fighters under Operation Cyclone. The program succeeded in its immediate objective: contributing to Soviet withdrawal. However, it also created a vast infrastructure of militant networks, training pipelines, and ideological mobilization that would outlast the conflict itself.

These networks did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. They evolved, adapted, and in many cases became central actors in subsequent regional conflicts.

In the post-9/11 era, Pakistan once again positioned itself as indispensable. It became a frontline ally in the war on terror, receiving substantial financial and military assistance from the United States. Yet throughout this period, concerns persisted regarding selective counterterrorism policies, militant safe havens, and the distinction between “good” and “bad” militants.

The discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011 crystallized these concerns. Found in close proximity to Pakistan’s military academy, his presence raised profound questions about institutional awareness, capacity, and intent.

This duality — cooperation on one hand, contradiction on the other — has defined U.S.–Pakistan relations for decades.

Today that same dynamic is being reintroduced into a different context: U.S.–Iran diplomacy.

At first glance, Pakistan’s involvement may appear pragmatic. Its geographic position and diplomatic channels provide potential utility. However, a deeper analysis reveals a more complex reality.

Pakistan is currently facing significant economic strain. Its leadership has publicly acknowledged financial pressures, and the country has increasingly relied on external assistance to stabilize its economy. Reports of debt obligations, negotiations with Gulf states, and efforts to secure additional funding illustrate a broader pattern: economic vulnerability reinforcing geopolitical behavior.

In such a context, strategic relevance becomes an asset.

And instability often sustains that relevance.

This creates a structural contradiction that cannot be ignored.

The same military leadership being presented as a stabilizing force in diplomacy has long been central to Pakistan’s regional strategy. When the architect of security policy becomes the face of mediation, the question is not merely whether peace is possible — but whether it aligns with underlying incentives.

This contradiction is not incidental; it is systemic.

Pakistan’s strategic posture has historically benefited from a degree of controlled instability. A stable and self-sufficient regional environment reduces its leverage, limits its strategic importance to external powers, and constrains the flow of economic and military assistance.

Conversely, periods of tension and crisis reinforce Pakistan’s position as an indispensable actor.

This dynamic has been observed repeatedly across decades of regional conflict.

It also explains why the concept of Pakistan as a neutral mediator is problematic.

Mediation requires more than access. It requires credibility, neutrality, and a demonstrated commitment to long-term stability. Pakistan’s historical record complicates all three.

For decades, it has faced persistent allegations — raised by neighboring states, international institutions, and Western governments — regarding its links to militant organizations operating across South Asia. These concerns are not limited to external observers. Former Pakistani leaders themselves have publicly discussed aspects of past policy involving militant actors, particularly in the context of Cold War and post-Cold War strategies.

These acknowledgments reinforce a broader perception: that Pakistan’s security doctrine has, at times, incorporated non-state actors as instruments of influence.

Whether framed as legacy policy or strategic necessity, the implications are significant.

They shape how Pakistan is perceived not only as a regional actor, but as a participant in any diplomatic process.

For U.S. policymakers, this presents a fundamental dilemma.

Engaging Pakistan may provide short-term tactical advantages. It may facilitate communication channels, logistical arrangements, and diplomatic access.

But it also introduces long-term strategic risk.

A peace process mediated or hosted by a state whose historical incentives have not consistently aligned with stability may struggle to achieve durability.

The issue is not simply trust. It is structure.

Peace agreements do not exist in isolation. They are embedded within broader geopolitical systems. If those systems contain unresolved contradictions, the agreements themselves become fragile.

This is particularly relevant in the case of U.S.–Iran relations.

Any agreement between Washington and Tehran will require not only negotiation, but sustained implementation over time. It will require confidence-building, enforcement mechanisms, and a stable regional environment.

Introducing actors whose strategic incentives may favor leverage over resolution complicates that process.

It risks transforming mediation into positioning.

And diplomacy into strategy.

The broader lesson is clear.

The success of any peace initiative depends not only on the parties involved, but on the structure surrounding them. It depends on aligning incentives with outcomes.

If the incentives reward instability, the outcome will reflect it.

If the incentives reward leverage over resolution, agreements will remain vulnerable.

In this context, the inclusion of Pakistan as a central diplomatic actor raises serious questions.

Not because engagement is impossible.

But because history suggests it may be unreliable.

The United States has faced this dilemma before.

And each time, the result has been the same: short-term gains followed by long-term complications.

If Washington is serious about achieving a durable agreement with Iran, it must avoid repeating that cycle.

Because in geopolitics, the most dangerous mistake is not misjudging an adversary.

It is misjudging a partner.